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Abstract
The question why a government chooses a specific service delivery tool to
provide public service to its citizenry is a central intellectual inquiry in public
administration. This paper develops a framework to explain the production and sector
choices of public services by political-economic environment, organizational capacity,
service market conditions, and nature of service. Using operation and financial data of
Georgia county governments during 2000-2006, we apply the framework to analyze
!"#$%&'()#*+,&"-.(/*01&)(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+-4(5#)*-&+%(#+(,6"("55"),-(#5(5&-)'1(
conditions and political interests. The logistic regression results show that the choice of
"7,"$+'1(/$#3*),&#+(&-(+"%',&2"18('--#)&',"3(9&,6(%#2"$+:"+,.-($"2"+*"($'&-&+%()'/')&,84(
:'+'%"$&'1()'/')&,84('+3()&,&;"+-.(/#1&,&)'1(3":'+3(5#$(1#)'1()#+,$#1(yet positively
associated with conservative ideology. The choice of private sector is positively
correlated with conservative political interest, increase in discretionary financial
resources, '+3(,6"()"+,$'1&,8(#5(%#2"$+:"+,.-(/#-&,&#+(&+(1#)'1(-"$2&)"(/$#2&-&#+(:'$<",=(
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I.

INTRODUC TION
During the last quarter of the past century, a resurgence of market-oriented

thoughts had provoked many public sector reforms in the United States. Reform
strategies included not only to run government like a business (Osborne and Gaebler
1992; Gore 1993), but also to introduce market mechanisms to production and delivery of
public goods and services to a great extent (Savas 1987, 2000; Kettl 1993; Seidenstat
1999; Auger 1999). A variety of public service provision tools, such as outsourcing,
which leverage resources and talents of government, private, and nonprofit organizations
in various manners, have been explored both in theory and in practice (Stern 1990, 1993;
Salamon 2002). Consequently, the question why a government chooses a specific tool to
provide public service to its citizenry became a central intellectual inquiry of public
administration scholars.
Past studies on privatization, outsourcing, or public-private partnerships have
examined a long list of factors that affect a gover+:"+,.-(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+4(
such as fiscal stress, economy of scale, market condition, unionization, conservatively
&3"#1#%84(+',*$"(#5(-"$2&)"4(",)=(>,(&-()#::#+18('%$""3(,6',('(%#2"$+:"+,.-(-"$2&)"(
outsourcing decision is ultimately an economic decision as well as a political one (Kettl
1993; Hirsch 1995; Sclar 2000; Ni and Bretschneider 2007). However, empirical studies
have generated mixed finding about the effects of fiscal and political factors. The
perplexing results may occur because of the multifaceted nature of fiscal and political
factors. Measured in disparate dimensions, fiscal or political variables may have different
"55"),-(#+('(%#2"$+:"+,.-(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+=(?*$,6"$:#$"4("7&-,&+%()#+,$'),&+%(
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and sector choice studies generally intend to model the service provision choice@the
choice of in-house provision, governmental supplier, or private provider (sometimes also
including non-profit provider)@all in one analyses using multinomial or ordered logit
(Brown and Potoski 2003; Feiock, Clinger, and Dasse 2003; Warner and Hefetz 2004;
Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2005; Feiock, Clinger, Shrestha, and Dasse 2007). Rather
than differentiating the stages in a service outsourcing decision, such analyses may
overlook the nuance of the complicated economic and political dynamics in the decision
making process. In addition to the mixed findings, most of the empirical research on
external service provision has been placed solely in the context of municipalities, little is
known about these local behaviors in larger regions beyond certain metropolitan areas.
To fill these research gaps, we develop a framework to examine the dynamics of
political-economic environment, organizational capacity, service market condition, and
nature of service in the production and sector choices of service provision (Ferris and
Graddy 1986, 1988) and analyze the effects of fiscal condition and political interests in
)#*+,8(%#2"$+:"+,-.(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+-(*-&+%(#/"$',&#+('+3(5&+'+)&'1(3','(#5(
Georgia counties during 2000-2006.
The article is organized as follows. The second section reviews the current
understanding of public service outsourcing. In the third section, we introduce the
theoretical framework of the two-stage service provision choice model, and discuss the
focus of this study. Data and research methods are explained in section four, followed by
the results of logistic regressions in section five. Finally, we summarize the findings and
address implications to public practitioners and researchers.
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I I. T H E M Y T H O F O U TSO U R C I N G
As driven by the privatization movement and the reinventing government
campaign in the past several decades, public sector organizations have adopted multiple
service provision tools, such as outsourcing, privatization, or publicAprivate partnerships,
in addition to the traditional in-house production and delivery of public services (Stern
1990, 1993; Salamon 2002). Among many of the new service provision tools,
outsourcing undoubtedly has increased in the past three decades, and research interest in
this area has also burgeoned. Railey and Tamkin define outsourcing as the act of an
B#$%'+&;',&#+(/'--C&+%D(,6"(/$#2&-&#+(#5('(-"$2&)"(#$("7")*,&#+(#5('(,'-<4(/$"2&#*-18(
undertaken in-house, to a third party to perform on its behal5E(FGHHIJKL=(M+3"$(-*)6(
arrangements, '(/*01&)('%"+)8(B$":'&+-(5*118($"-/#+-&01"(5#$(,6"(/$#2&-&#+(#5('55"),"3(
services and maintains control over management decisions, while another entity operates
,6"(5*+),&#+(#$(/"$5#$:-(,6"(-"$2&)"E(F!NO(GHHPJQL=(M+1&<e privatization, through
outsourcing, the delivery of public service may be transferred to existing vendors in both
the private and public sector.
No matter it is in private or public sector organizations, the decision to outsource
is often made based on cost-efficiency. It is widely believed that the beauty of
outsourcing has been the relative production cost advantage of external service providers
(Donahue 1989; Savas 2000). Numerous studies have cited monetary or cost-efficiency
as a key factor in government outsourcing decisions (Kettl 1993; Hirsh 1995; Seindenstat
1999). In recent decades, as local governments have been experiencing financial stress
due to property tax revolts or decreased intergovernmental transfers, outsourcing has
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often been considered as an alternative to reduce taxpayer burden (Hirsch 1995; Boyne
1998). However, empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal condition and
outsourcing is mixed. Boyne (1998) points out that most of the empirical results on the
relationship between fiscal stress and outsourcing are statistically insignificant and
suggests reconsider the theoretical relationship between fiscal condition and outsourcing.
It is learned in some studies that local governments may adopt outsourcing to improve
service quality and those governments that are in better fiscal condition are more likely to
'55#$3(,6&-(/*$/#-"(2&%#$#*-18=(?#$("7':/1"4(O.R##1"('+3(S"&"$(FTUUVL(&+('(-,*38(#5(
outsourcing in school districts found that high levels of local resources were positively
related to the amount of outsourcing. Therefore, past empirical studies may have falsely
combined two distinct subgroups of governments@those pursuing service quality and
those pursuing cost savings@into a single sample (Boyne 1998). In a recent study of
intergovernmental contracts, Carr et al (2008) find that limited fiscal capacity often leads
many local governments, especially townships, to work collaboratively with state or
county actors to provide services; however, local governments with greater fiscal
capacity, especially cities, are stronger potential partners and so are more likely to
contract with other local governments using horizontal arrangements.
In addition to economic rationalities, outsourcing decision is also subjected to
political and ideological considerations. Outsourcing decisions are often considered to
have a positive relation with conservative ideology of limiting and downsizing
government. Public decision makers with more conservative values tend to have stronger
ties to private sector businesses and hence favor outsourcing, especially privatization.

4

However, empirical evidence of political and ideological factors in outsourcing decision
is very limited (i.e. Brudney, Fernardez, Ryu, and Wright 2005). Ni and Bretschneider
(2007) found the impact of ideological composition of government decision makers on
outsourcing decisions was discrepant, which somehow reflects the rhetoric value of
outsourcing being used by both parties to win popular support. Their findings, however,
also indicate that, despite the rhetoric value of outsourcing, political competition may
hinder the decision, because the checks and balances of political control will prevent over
usage of contracts. In addition, constituency interests in outsourcing are multifaceted.
!"+"$'118(-/"'<&+%4(#*,-#*$)&+%(&-(&+(3&-'%$"":"+,(9&,6()#+-,&,*"+,-.(&+,"$"-,-(&+(1#)'1
)#+,$#14(0")'*-"(%#2"$+:"+,-.($"1&'+)"(#+(#,6"$("+,&,&"-(5#$(-"$2&)"(3"1&2"$8()#*13(1"'3(,#('(
declination of local representation and inflexibility to meet community needs. However,

outsourcing, especially to private sector, is consistent with high-income or business
-"),#$()#+-,&,*"+,-.(&+,"$"-,(&+(-:'11(%#2"$+:"+,('+3(:#$"(":/1#8:"+,(#//#$,*+&,&"-=(
W*$"'*)$',-.()#:/1"7(&+,"$"-,-('1-#('33(,#(,6"(/#1&,&)'1(/*;;1" of outsourcing. This can be
illustrated by the disparate interests embedded in different institutional settings of
government. For example, the council-manager form of government is associated with
professionally trained manager or chief administrator, whose professional training is
expected to bring in the economic vigor desired for the government. Thus professional
manager is more likely associated with outsourcing to attain economic benefits (Jang
2006; Miranda and Kim 2006). However, professional manager usually connotes better
organization capacity in management and production. In addition, having public services
produced in-house and thus supervising the large amount of government revenue directly,
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public manager could have more bureaucratic power over the organization. For example,
Brown and Potoski (2003) found that, ceteris paribus, the presence of a professional
manager is correlated with in-house service production. Jang (2006) in a study of park
and recreation service (a periphery service to bureaucratic power) contracting found that
professional managers are active in contracting municipal service deliveries to the
external providers not on order to reduce expenditure level but for better service qualities.
Therefore, despite the proliferation of literature on privatization, contracting, and
outsourcing and the augmentation of causal factors examined by past studies, the effects
of fiscal and political determinants to service provision decisions remain a mystery.
Despite the multifaceted nature of these determinants, existing studies on contracting and
sector choice, which uniformly have used a multinomial logit model, has not shined
much light on these intellectual perplexities. Those studies generally use the in-house
provision of the service as the base case and compare it with other governmental and
private provisions (in some cases, also non-profit provision). This method is not effective
in observing the nuance of the political and economic dynamics in two-stages of
outsourcing decisions: first, the choice of whether to produce services internally or
externally (production choice) and second, the choice of sector with whom to contract@
other governments, private firms, or nonprofit organizations (sector choice) (Ferris and
Graddy 1986), as it is reasonable to expect that some financial and political factors may
have different impacts in production and sector choices.

I I I. A F R A M E W O R K O F O U TSO U R C I N G D E C ISI O N
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Drawing from the foregoing insights, we treat the service outsourcing decision as
a two-stage dynamic process including the production choice and then the sector choice.
The central thesis is that economic and political interests, along with other factors, may
have different impacts in different stage of outsourcing decision.
The production choice is primarily influenced by cost-efficiency considerations as
well as the nature of service. Economic environment factors, such as economy of scales,
fiscal capacity, and market conditions are expected to have an impact on outsourcing
decision. The sector choice is ultimately a political decision though largely constrained
by service nature and market condition. At this stage, public expenditure is at the
discretion of decision makers to achieve different purposes, for instance, to subsidize
private sector or to maintain government control, to pursuing better quality and more
diversity or to persist traditional service provision channels. The nature of service is also
a defining factor in sector choice. Governments may be more likely to outsource
peripheral services than core services, more likely to outsource business-type activities
than governmental-activities, and more likely to outsource services that involve lower
transaction cost in the contracting process (Donahue 1989; Stern 1990, 1993; Globerman
and Vining 1996; Hodge 2000). In some cases, the characteristics of the service alone
define the sector choice for service with a pure public good or coercive nature is not
likely to be outsourced to a private firm.1
In this study, we focus on the effects of fiscal condition and political interests.
Fiscal condition and Political interests are two important of the political-economic

1

R6"('*,6#$-(9#*13(1&<"(,#(,6'+<(#+"($"2&"9"$.-()#::"+,(#+("55"),(#5(-"$2&)"(+',*$"(#+(-"),#$()6#&)"=
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environment that relates to organizational production capacity. These fiscal and political
factors may be measured in different dimensions, which may have different
manifestations on the service provision decision. For instance, fiscal condition of a
locality may be measured by revenue-raising capacity, the actual revenues collected from
multiple tax bases, the availability of discretionary resources, or the change of capacity or
actual revenues. Likewise, political factors of local service delivery may be reflected not
only by partisan ideologies, but also by the level of political activity. By disentangling
fiscal and political factors in multiple ways, we can examine their intricate effects on the
choice of public service delivery. In particular, we will test the following hypotheses:
!

A government with better fiscal condition is less likely to outsource their service
production (H 1);

!

If a government with better fiscal condition does outsource, it is more likely to
choose private sector services vendors (H 2) ;

!

A government in an ideologically more conservative community is more likely to
outsource its service (H 3);

!

If a government with conservative ideology does outsource, it is more likely to do
so to private sector vendors (H 4).

IV. D A T A A N D M E T H O D O L O G Y
We test the above hypotheses in the context of Georgia counties during 2000-

8

2006.2 The units of analysis are !"#$%&'()#*+,&"-.(service outsourcing decisions to 19
common public services from year 2001 to 2006 (see Table 1).3 We use a sample of
10661 observations to examine the production choice model, that is, the probability that a
)#*+,8(9#*13(#*,-#*$)"('(/'$,&)*1'$(-"$2&)"(FBOMREL=(X"%'$3&+g the sector choice model,
the sample size is 2870, where a local service is outsourced either to private vendors or
other governments. The dependent variable is the probability that a service would be
)#+,$'),"3(,#(/$&2',"(2"+3#$-(FBYX>ZNR[EL4(&5(#*,-#*$)ed.
The two-stage model of outsourcing decision is presented by the following
equations:
[Table 1 about here]

"

!"# $%% %"&$% '(#)*&(' +#")*,(,! -".*/"012*3/ ##$ # 4 "$*! 5 *3"/%#$ $

(1)

64 012*3/ ##! -".*/"7869:2; *3/ ##$ # ."$*! 5 *3"/%#$ $

(2)

where

f =" model for the production choice, g = model for the sector choice;
i = service, j = government, t = year, t -1= one-year time-lag;

$I = a fixed-effect for service i; and
X = a vector of independent variables.
Description and summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2 and
2

The data of public service provision come from Georgia Government Management Indicators Survey
(2001-2006). The major sources of fiscal data are Georgia Local Government F inance Survey (2000-2005)
by Georgia DCA, and Statistical Report (2000-2005). The primary source of socioeconomic data is the
Georgia County Guide . The election data come from the Office of the Secretary, State of Georgia.
3
Georgia has 158 counties, among which there are 4 city-county consolidated governments, which are
excluded from our data sample. Excluding missing data record, we get a sample of 19399 local service
provision choices. Slightly more than half (10661 among 19399) of these services were provided, either
locally or through outsourcing.
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R'01"(\=(N(%#2"$+:"+,.-($"2"+*"-raising capacity is measured by logged per capita
property tax base (PTCLG) and logged per capita sales tax base (STCLG). Property tax is
the mainstay of local finance for Georgia counties, and so PTCLG is the major indicator
of local fiscal capacity (Zhao, 2005). Local option sales tax is a smaller portion of local
revenue than the property tax. However, Georgia counties with higher per capita sales tax
0'-"-(6'2"(6&%6"$()'/'0&1&,8(,#(B"7/#$,E(,'7(0*$3"+s to nonresidents, which may result in
different preference of service level and provision choice (Zhao and Hou, 2008). The
actual revenue of a county is measured by logged per capita total revenue (TRVLG),
which includes both own-source revenues and all intergovernmental transfers. TRVLG
also reflects the actual budget level, because Georgia counties are required to balance
their annual budget. We also include the percentage of annual changes for these fiscal
measures, denoted as PTCCH, STCCH, and TRVCH, respectively. A significant decrease
of tax base or budget is an indicator of fiscal stress. An increase of tax base or budget, on
the other hand, provides slack resources for local governments. We expect these fiscal
variables to be negatively associated with the probability of outsourcing, because
counties with higher fiscal capacity or expenditure levels may have higher organizational
production capacity to provide services by themselves ( H 1). For services that are
outsourced, however, counties in better fiscal condition, especially with more slack
resources, may be more likely to choose private sector service vendors to achieve better
quality or diversity ( H 2).
[Table 2 and Table 3 about here]
Political interests are represented by DEMREP, TURNOUT, and UNPAVED.
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DEMREP is the ratio of Democratic vs. Republican votes in gubernatorial elections. It is
expected to have negative impacts on both the production choice and the sector choice,
because counties with predominantly Republican voters may have a pro-market tendency
that favors outsourcing ( H 3), especially to the private sector ( H 4). TURNOUT is the
percentage of population voting in gubernatorial elections. Counties with higher voting
rates, regardless partisan preferences, may have lower probability in both production and
sector choice models, because residents that are politically active may favor in-house or
public service to maintain local control in service delivery. Lastly, UNPAVED is the
percentage of local roads that are unpaved. Construction and maintenance of local roads
are considered a key service provided by Georgia counties. With similar level of fiscal
capacity, counties with higher UNPAVED may have a bias again public infrastructure.
Thus UNPAVED may reflect a choice of low public service level and is expected to have
positive impact on the sector choice.
In addition, we control for other variables that are considered important or
typically included in past literature on local service provision. Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSA) is often used as a differentiator of urban or rural areas, which may affect
the economy of scale or availability of service options (Honadle 1984; Walls, Macauley,
and Anderson 2005; Feiock, Clingermayer, Sherestha, and Dasse 2007). We also include
population, personal income, educational level, and the percentages of black, senior, and
population under poverty (Feiock and Clingermayor 2001, Morgan and Hirlinger 1991).4

4

Personal income is highly correlated with educational level and was thus dropped from the models.
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V . R ESU L TS
Regression results for the two-stage service provision choice are presented in
Table 4. For both stages of choice, we include two separate models to account for two
sets of fiscal variables to avoid multicollinearity between the actual budget level and
revenue-raising capacity. For each model, we report coefficients, standard errors, and
standardized odds-ratio of independent variables. In addition, to better interpret the
results of Logit regressions, in Figure 1 & 2 we plot the predicted effects of several
variables that are most influential to the dependent variables.
[Table 4, Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here]
!

The Production Choice (model P1 and P2)
The empirical results of fiscal variables generally support our hypothesis H1. Per

capita budget level (TRVLG) and revenue-raising capacity (both PTCLG and STCLG)
all have negative and significant coefficients, indicating that counties with better fiscal
condition are less likely to outsource their services. With a slightly lower Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), Model P2 has a better fit than Model P1. This suggests that
the probability of outsourcing is more directly related to revenue-raising capacity than the
actual budget level, but the difference is marginal. In particular, the standardized oddsratio for PTCLG is 0.787, that is, if PTCLG increases one standard deviation, the oddsratio of outsourcing would decrease by a factor of 0.787. If PTCLG increases from its
minimum to its maximum, the odds-ratio of outsourcing may decrease by a factor of
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0.238.5 Likewise, the overall magnitude of effect is about 0.416 for TRVLG and about
0.598 for STCLG. For the annual change of fiscal condition, PTCCH and STCCH both
have negative coefficients as expected. The only unexpected finding is the positive and
significant coefficient for TRVCH, which suggests that the probability of outsourcing is
higher if a county has a sudden increase of budget level that is probably due to increase in
intergovernmental transfers, because the increases of property tax and sales tax capacities
do not have the same effect.
The results of political variables also support our hypothesis H3. DemocratRepublican Ratio has a negative and significant coefficient in both P1 and P2, meaning
that counties with strong Republican preference are more likely to outsource. This is
consistent with our earlier expectation. The overall magnitude of the partisan effect is
about 0.413, that is, the odds-ratio of outsourcing will decease by a factor of 0.413 for
counties with mostly Democratic votes than for those with mostly Republican votes. The
level of voter TURNOUT shows expected negative signs on both P1 and P2, but the
coefficient is only significant in P1 (with a magnitude of 0.626). These results for
TUNROUT reaffirms our assumptions that political competition hinders public decisionmaking and that active citizens do not like services provided by third parties. Results of
several other variables also confirm our hypotheses on organizational production
capacity. Counties with professional managers are less likely to outsource. The result is
consistent with previous findings (i.e., Brown and Potoski 2003; Ni 2007) and supports
our presumption that an appointed manager connotes better organizational capacity and
5

The result is calculated assuming that PTCLG ranges from -3 standard deviation to +3 standard deviation,
and so the magnitude of overall effect is 0.787^6 = 0.238.
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has the preference of developing public service in-house to enhance their bureaucratic
power. Counties run by appointed professional managers rather than elected
commissioners may be less likely to outsource because of higher in-house organizational
capacity. Counties in MSAs are less likely to outsource, probably because they tend to
have higher level of scale economy. 6 Though metropolitan areas often offer more
service-provider options, county level governments may be central government service
providers to other lower level agencies (Hoene, Baldassare, and Shires 2002; Carr 2004).
Counties with higher socioeconomic status (indicated by higher EDULEVEL, lower
POVERTY, and less SENIOR) are less likely to outsource, probably because they have
higher internal organizational capacity.
Overall, it is safe to say that results from the production choice model support our
hypotheses that the decision of outsourcing is affected by both political interests and
organizational capacity.
!

The Sector Choice (model S1 and S2)
As is expected in hypothesis H 6, the sector choice is predominantly affected by

political variables in both models (S1 and S2). First, although Democrat-Republican
Ratio is not significant, its effect is picked up by the negative correlation of BLACK to
private suppliers. Second, as expected, counties with higher level of public roads unpaved

6

Feiock, Clingermayer, Sherestha, and Dasse 2007 found that cities in an MSA (both urban and suburban
cities) are more likely to contract to profit-seeking firms than other cities as metropolitan areas offer more
service-provider options, including for-profit providers. However, ICMA data shows that MSA urban cities
are less likely to outsource while MSA suburban cities are more like to outsource (Walls, Macauley, and
Anderson 2005). The focus of this study is on counties, which may have different outsourcing decision
mechanism from that of cities because of their different services responsibilities, relative scale of economy,
or roles in the interlocal service B:'$<",=E For instance, vertical cooperation may occur between cities and
counties when they are on the opposite side of interlocal exchange.
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are more likely to select private sector vendors in outsourcing. The overall magnitude is
2.986 odds ratio. The results for BLACK and UNPAVED strongly support our
hypothesis that counties that are more politically conservative are more like to outsource
their services to private sector vendors (H 4). Fourth, the coefficient of voter TURNOUT
has the expected sign but not significant. It seems that the activeness of citizenry has
more impact on the production choice rather than on the sector choice. This result reflects
that bipartisan citizen groups are effective at preventing externalizing service production
when their interests of internalizing control converge; however, their impacts in sector
choice decisions may be traded off due to their divergent interests in public or private
sector vendors.
The effects of fiscal variables on the sector choice are at most marginal. With two
sets of fiscal variables, model S1 and S2 are almost identical in their explanatory power,
and they yield insignificant coefficients for most fiscal variables. The only exception is
the annual change of sales tax capacity (STCCH), which has a positive and significant
effect on private contracting, with an overall effect of 2.138 odds-ratio. It seems that
governments with more discretionary resources are more likely to choose private sector
service production. Another possible explanation is that sales tax base may not be a pure
indicator of fiscal conditions 0*,('1-#('+(&+3&)',#$(#5('()#*+,8.-($#1"(&+(,6"($"%&#+'1(
service market. Georgia counties with significant annual growth of sales tax capacity in
recent years tend to be new regional sales centers in the south (Zhao and Hou, 2008). Far
from major cities like Atlanta, these counties probably have higher organizational
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capacity than most local governments nearby, and therefore they are less likely to
contract to other governments for services.
A surprising finding from the sector choice models is that education level is very
closely associated with private outsourcing. The overall effect is about 57.042 in oddsratio. We find that in Georgia counties education level is highly correlated with personal
income, and also positively related to conservative political ideology. It is possible that
EDULEVEL in this context reflects an additional aspect of political interests associated
with socioeconomic status. Professional management does not have a significant effect
on sector choice. This confirms our expectation that organizational capacity is more
important for the production choice than for the sector choice.

V I. C O N C L USI O N
Public service provision choice is a multifaceted, complicated decision. We
disentangle the effects of fiscal conditions, political environments, and other institutional
arrangements in the production and sector choice decisions with Georgia counties. The
empirical results indicate that the effects of fiscal conditions and political interests vary in
different stages of outsourcing decision.
Overall this study fills an important gap and helps resolve many of the
perplexities in public administration literature. It will also help public managers
contemplating outsourcing in confrontation of cost-efficiency incentives. First, our
findings help better understand the nature of outsourcing in public organizations.
Outsourcing is a complex, dynamic decision. At different stages of decision-making,
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economic and political rationalities vary significantly. While in production choice,
government decision weights more toward economic factors; in sector choice it is more
likely to be affected by political considerations. Second, the findings help disentangle
many aspects of the relationship between fiscal condition and outsourcing decision.
Under fiscal stress, a government may choose to produce externally to gain costefficiency; with more slack resources, it may privatize to pursue service quality and
diversity. Third, they help delineate the complex interests associated with outsourcing in
local political environment. Outsourcing, though contending the %"+"$'1(/*01&).-(&+,"$"-,(
in local control, se$2"-(-/")&'1(&+,"$"-,(%$#*/-.(3"-&$"-J(/#1&,&)&'+-(:'8(*-"(&,(,#($"9'$3(
their patrons; bureaucrats may exploit it to enhance internal control; and special interest
groups may leverage it to strengthen or expand their business or employment
opportunities. Finally, the results also point to some of the new areas for future research
efforts. Besides fiscal conditions and political interests, the study of the characteristics of
different public services, the competitiveness of local public service markets, and the
natural and institutional settings of governments (i.e. the comparative advantage of a
locality in a regional service market) can certainly uncover some more ulterior patterns in
local public service outsourcing decision. As providing high quality service to citizenry
will be the unchangeable theme of public administration, more research effort in public
service provision mechanisms will be indispensable.
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Table 1: Service provision alternatives (2001-2006)
Service Type
Animal control
Building inspection
Building permits
Construction/code enforcement
Emergency medical services
Emergency 911
Fire protection
Health screening services
Jail
Law enforcement
Planning
Public hospital
Public transit
Senior citizen program
Wastewater collection
Wastewater treatment
Water distribution
Water supply
Water treatment

In-house
delivery
47.70
68.16
78.64
73.05
58.08
73.75
70.56
22.55
92.22
99.40
67.17
2.99
35.93
53.89
14.27
12.48
25.45
20.66
18.76

1

Outsource
to other gov.
10.88
4.99
3.79
3.79
15.87
12.67
16.17
19.16
6.39
0.40
9.68
33.83
7.68
13.47
17.37
19.16
23.05
27.94
26.15

Outsource
to private
4.29
0.90
0.20
0.80
21.56
0.00
2.10
4.49
0.10
0.00
3.49
3.59
11.18
9.18
1.70
1.60
1.60
1.90
2.59

Not
provided
37.13
25.95
17.37
22.36
4.49
13.57
11.18
53.79
1.30
0.20
19.66
59.58
45.21
23.45
66.67
66.77
49.90
49.50
52.50

Variable
OUT
PRIVATE
MSA
POPLG
POPLG2
EDULEVEL
POVERTY
MANAGER
TRVLG
TRVCH
PTCLG
STCLG
PTCCH
STCCH
UNPAVED
DEMREP
TURNOUT
BLACK
SENIOR

Table 2: Description of variables
Description
Outsourcing [1], inhouse prodcution[0]
Outsourcing to private sector[1], to other governments [0]
Metropolitan Statistical Areas [1], otherwise [0]
Population (log)
Square log-population
Percentage of population over 25 with 4-year college education
Percentage of population under poverty line
Professional manager [1], otherwise[0]
Per capita total revenue (log)
Annual change of per capita real total revevue
Per capita property tax base (log)
Per capita sales tax base (log)
Annual change of per capita property tax base
Annual change of per capita sales tax base
Percentage of local roads unpaved
Ratio of Dem/Rep votes in gubernatoral elections
Percentage of population vote in gubernatoral elections
Percentage of black population
Percentage of population with age 65 or above

Note:

Table 3: Summary descriptives of production and section model
Production model
Sector model
(n=10661, OUT=27%)
(n=2870, PRIVATE=21%)
Mean St.D.
Min
Max
Mean St.D.
Min
Max
MSA
0.30
–
0.00
1.00
0.27
–
0.00
1.00
POPLG
10.26
1.13
7.51 13.73
10.27
1.11
7.51 13.73
EDULEVEL 14.92
7.73
5.43 43.59
14.07
6.15
5.43 43.59
POVERTY
15.44
5.91
2.61 30.68
15.60
5.50
2.61 30.68
MANAGER
0.40
0.49
0.00
1.00
0.37
0.48
0.00
1.00
TRVLG
6.28
0.27
5.10
7.25
6.26
0.27
5.10
7.25
TRVCH
1.03
0.15
0.45
2.61
1.03
0.14
0.45
2.61
PTCLG
3.13
0.36
2.20
4.48
3.09
0.33
2.24
4.48
STCLG
1.94
0.72 -2.09
3.10
1.94
0.76 -2.09
3.10
PTCCH
1.05
0.11
0.52
1.77
1.05
0.10
0.65
1.60
STCCH
1.00
0.11
0.21
2.38
0.99
0.11
0.21
2.38
UNPAVED
27.00 16.68
0.20 66.70
26.29 17.04
0.20 64.40
DEMREP
0.73
0.46
0.20
3.65
0.72
0.42
0.20
3.65
TURNOUT
25.40
6.65 10.76 51.84
24.95
6.36 10.76 51.84
BLACK
26.45 17.64
0.12 85.79
25.83 17.85
0.12 85.79
SENIOR
10.08
5.02
0 26.58
10.27
4.91
0
3.28
Note: Fiscal measures are in constant 2000 dollar.

2

Table 4: Fixed-effects Logit regressions for the production and sector choice
Production:
(OUT)
MSA
POPLG
POPLG2
EDULEVEL
POVERTY
MANAGER
TRVLG
TRVCH
PTCLG
STCLG
PTCCH
STCCH
UNPAVED
DEMREP
TURNOUT
BLACK
SENIOR
AIC
Sector:
(PRIVATE)
MSA
POPLG
POPLG2
EDULEVEL
POVERTY
MANAGER
TRVLG
TRVCH
PTCLG
STCLG
PTCCH
STCCH
UNPAVED
DEMREP
TURNOUT
BLACK
SENIOR
AIC

Model P1
Coef.
St. E. S.O.Ratio
-0.363***
0.083
0.848
-1.029***
0.363
0.312
0.054***
0.017
3.734
-0.042***
0.007
0.720
0.027***
0.009
1.175
-0.316***
0.058
0.856
-0.538***
0.112
0.864
0.420**
0.181
1.064
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
-0.009***
0.002
0.856
-0.301***
0.104
0.870
-0.012**
0.004
0.925
0.002
0.003
1.037
0.013**
0.006
1.067
9180 (df = 10661)
Model S1
Coef.
St. E. S.O.Ratio
-0.219
0.171
0.907
2.971***
0.882
26.730
-0.164***
0.043
0.022
0.103***
0.016
1.886
-0.009
0.018
1.049
0.039
0.116
1.019
-0.007
0.236
0.998
-0.279
0.416
0.963
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.011**
0.005
1.204
0.241
0.256
1.108
-0.001
0.010
0.995
-0.019***
0.006
0.709
0.018
0.012
0.917
2290 (df = 2870)

Model P2
Coef.
St. E. S.O.Ratio
-0.437***
0.085
0.819
-0.685*
0.378
0.460
0.039**
0.018
2.591
-0.033***
0.007
0.774
0.033***
0.009
1.212
-0.318***
0.058
0.856
–
–
–
–
–
–
-0.666***
0.100
0.787
-0.119***
0.051
0.918
-0.049
0.283
0.995
-0.130
0.246
0.986
-0.014***
0.003
0.794
-0.319***
0.103
0.863
-0.004
0.005
0.975
-0.002
0.003
0.966
0.016***
0.006
1.083
9150 (df = 2870)
Model S2
Coef.
St. E. S.O.Ratio
-0.282
0.177
0.882
2.999***
0.928
27.55
-0.165***
0.045
0.021
0.110***
0.017
1.962
0.010
0.018
1.055
.029
0.118
1.014
–
–
–
–
–
–
-0.150
0.213
0.951
-0.038
0.098
0.971
-0.344
0.619
0.966
1.142**
0.520
1.135
0.011**
0.005
1.200
0.295
0.162
1.124
-0.001
0.010
0.994
-0.021***
0.007
0.684
0.016
0.012
0.922
2290 (df = 2870)

Fixed effects for the services are not reported in the table.
* Significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
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